Fichte and Gentile - Notes about the relationship between Transcendental Idealism and Actual Idealism by Fusaro, Diego
 UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DE PERNAMBUCO Ano 16 • n. 1 • jan/jun. 2016-1  
________________________________ ÁGORA FILOSÓFICA______________________________________________ 
 
 
4 
Fichte and Gentile - Notes about the relationship between 
Transcendental Idealism and Actual Idealism. 
 
Diego Fusaro* 
DOI 10.20399/P1982-999X.2016v1n1pp04-22 
 
ABSTRACT: This essay is to express some considerations about the theoretical relation which 
bonds the Actual Idealism of Giovanni Gentile to the "system of freedom" concerning the 
Wissenschaftslehre or 'Doctrine of Science' of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. The Doctrine seems to 
have rightful claim to be the philosophical system nearest to the Actualistic code, which was to 
be openly developed by Gentile in the early years of twentieth century, and the seeds of which 
had already been sewn by the monographic studies dedicated to Rosmini and Gioberti, from one 
side, and to Marx, from another. The essay discusses the conceptual lineage of Actual Idealism, 
it's specific links to Doctrine of Science as a critique of Kant and Hegel, and possible reasons 
for the widely perceived lack of acknowledgement perceptible in the Italian thinker's work. 
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"An Idealism so strictly conceived to play 
the role assigned by Fichte to philosophy as 
epistemological doctrine; a role neglected 
even by Hegel." (G. GENTILE, Teoria 
generale dello spirito come atto puro) 
 
1. Foreword 
The principal idea of this essay is to express some considerations about the 
theoretical relation which bonds the Actual Idealism of Giovanni Gentile to the “system 
of freedom”1 concerning the Wissenschaftslehre of Johann Gottlieb Fichte. 
On the basis of an accurate analysis, widely underlined by a vast amount of 
critical study2, the Doctrine of Science seems to have right to the claim that it is the 
philosophical system is nearest to the Actualistic code, which was to be openly 
developed by Gentile from the early years of twentieth century, and which had already 
germinated in his monographic studies dedicated to Rosmini and Gioberti3, from one 
perspective, and to Marx4, from another. 
                                                          
*
 Diego Fusaro. Facoltà di Filosofia Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele – Milano. e-mail: 
fusaro@filosofico.net / diego.fusaro1983@gmail.com 
1
 See L. Pareyson, Fichte. Il sistema libertà, Mursia, Milano 1976 (first edition: 1950), pp. 13-22. 
2Such studies will be examined and discussed furthermore in this essay. 
3See G. Gentile, Rosmini e Gioberti. Saggio storico sulla Filosofia italiana del Risorgimento, 1898, 
Sansoni, Firenze 1955, p. 81 (all quotations from the pages of the Italian edition are translated directly by 
the author since Gentile’s works are lacking a full definitive translation in English and moreover the body 
of the translated works is not always consistent). In the text on Rosmini and Gioberti, it is already present 
the assumption of the idea of "how the reality itself and the thought seen as the same principle of being" 
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This kind of consideration necessarily implies taking seriously the theoretical 
bond that links the philosophical reflection of Gentile to the System der Freiheit of 
Fichte, first of all by exploring the principal points in Gentile's works where the 
Fichteian system is explicitly discussed, but also by critically analysing the theoretical 
plexus which, though not directly invoking Fichte's name, develops - with some very 
strong echoes- some of the main cores of the Wissenschaftslehre. Such an operation 
manly involves an exploration and a provisional discussion of the critical studies on the 
subject appearing over the years. On the other hand, it is irrelevant to the principal 
purposes of this survey to enter an analysis of the relations that, on the social and 
political level, bond the Gentile's system to Fichte's.5. 
 
   2. A Fichteian reform of Hegel's dialectical method? 
 
With regards to the theoretical relation between Gentile's Actual Idealism and 
Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre, there seems to be an apparent paradox which has been 
underlined by Aldo Masullo in his important research of 1982, dedicated to "The 
thought of G.A. Fichte in the Italian culture6". The paradox can be so formulated, in 
deliberately radical terms - as we'll see - so as to require a further investigation: On the 
one hand, Fichte’s "system of freedom" represents the real "secret source", the 
inspiration on which Gentile built the code of Actual Idealism, through a so-called 
Fichteian reform of Hegel's argumentation; by virtue of which reform the fundamental 
category becomes that of the 'act-in-act,' already present, though in a form not so easily 
assimilated as that of Gentile, in Fichte’s Doctrine of science. On the other hand 
Gentile, who incessantly refers to Kant, Spaventa, and most often to Hegel -a 
"reformed" Hegel in any case -rarely mentions Fichte, and only then a marginal way; 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(ibidem). See A. Galimberti, Gioberti, Gentile, Rosmini, in “Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana”, n. 2 
(1978), pp. 172-187. 
4
 See G. Gentile, La filosofia di Marx, Sansoni, Firenze 19745 (1899), p. 78. See G. Sasso, Giovanni 
Gentile: gli scritti su Marx, in “La Cultura”, anno XXXV, n. 1 (1977), pp. 33-82; P. Serra, Una critica al 
materialismo storico. Gentile su Marx, in “Il Cannocchiale”, n. 2 (1993), pp. 69-81; A. Signorini, Il 
giovane Gentile e Marx, Giuffrè, Milano 1966. In the two juvenile works it is established the coincidence 
between dissociated Marxism, seen as praxis philosophy, from materialism, and dissociated Giobertism, 
seen as philosophy of creation, from the Platonism and ontological philosophy: this coincidence defines 
Actual Idealism (see A. Del Noce, Giovanni Gentile. Per una interpretazione, Il Mulino, Bologna 1990, 
p. 93). 
5
 See R.S. Harris, Fichte e Gentile, in “Giornale Critico della Filosofia Italiana”, 1964, p. 557: “Fichte e 
Gentile come to identical results in interpreting the history of their nations, they preach the same political 
doctrines and keep in the same high consideration the problem of national education". 
6
 See A. Masullo, Il pensiero di Fichte nella cultura italiana, in “Annali della Facoltà di Lettere e 
Filosofia dell’Università di Napoli”, Giannini, Napoli 1984, pp. 159-160. 
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never recognizing the latter's importance for the genesis of the Actualistic dialectic, and 
quoting him only in order to criticize him and to stress the distance which separates him 
from that system of thought which, at a first sight, would seem to be so near to Actual 
Idealism.  
Therefore, the paradox underlined by Masullo lies in the fact that Gentile's 
reform of Hegel's dialectic ends up being conceived by the Sicilian philosopher in a way 
that removes Fichte's contribution to the movement in which it, in reality, it is not only 
utilised, but systematically assimilated. Hence Gentile's Actual Idealism would come to 
a maturation in the elaborating of theoretical points already present in Fichte, albeit with 
a different slant (e.g. the centrality of the act as a supposition of the fact, the deduction 
of the being from act-in-act, the declination of the Idealism in a subjective way, the 
accomplishment of the changing transzendentalphilosophisch started by Kant,) and 
likewise it could be a read as a continuous reducing, or in some ways neutralizing tout 
court the importance of the Wissenschaftslehre as the main source of its own discourse. 
As regards the removal of the Fichteian element, a convincing answer can be 
found in the aforementioned text by Masullo. Retracing in its essential features Fichte’s 
Wirkungsgeschichte in the Italian nineteenth-century culture, Masullo has shown how 
reductively, in the Italian environment, the thinker of Rammenau was interpreted: that 
there was a surreptitious flattening of the perspective of Transcendental Idealism in 
reference to the epistemological problems, with the attendant neglect of the 
"extraordinary richness of Fichte’s ethical, juridical and political ideas, and the relations 
intrinsically linking these to their theoretical elaborations, which are sufficient in their 
own right to allow the inference of one another’s true significance".7 
In other words, according to Masullo, in the dominant Italian nineteenth-century 
reception, (Bertrando Spaventa primarily), Fichte has been exclusively read as a theorist 
of epistemology, in a hermeneutical way which not only doesn’t do justice to, but 
indeed, tends to remove the socio-political as well as the ontological and metaphysical 
perspective. 
The consequence of such a background manifests, to Masullo's mind in a disquieting 
and paradoxical form, "In Giovanni Gentile’s ‘silence’8", namely the aforementioned 
conspicuous and continuously repeated omission of any discussion of Fichteian thought, 
so present in the theoretical foundations of Actualist code. 
                                                          
7Ivi, p. 159. 
8
 Ivi, p. 160. 
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This is a silence that, in one respect, inherits the nineteenth-century 
interpretative mode which, with Spaventa, makes Fichte a mere point of transition – in 
itself scarcely relevant - in the evolution of the German thought leading from Kant to 
Hegel (this hermeneutical tradition is not only Italian; if we consider that it is found, 
albeit in a different shape, also in the Richard Kroner by Von Kant bis Hegel9), and in 
another respect, it marks the presence of a deliberate neglect .  
In the General Theory of Spirit as Pure Act as well as in the Reform of Hegel's 
dialectic, Gentile discusses with a particular rigor and method the passage from the 
Kantian to the Hegelian system, yet always omitting the theoretical solutions proposed 
by Fichte (in contrast, they were at least analyzed by Kroner, though he presented them 
as a mere point of transition to the Hegelian absolute ideal).  
The aforementioned removal would be due to the fact that Gentile was, after all, 
perfectly aware – to the point of having to hide it - of the profound influence exerted by 
the Wissenschaftslehre on the genesis of Actual Idealism and its Hegelian reform10. Yet 
at the same time Gentile, son of his time and heir to the aforementioned only-
epistemological interpretation of Fichte typical in the Italian tradition, ends up 
criticising - in the rare passages of his works where he confronts himself with the 
German philosopher - not properly Fichte, but his stereotyped image: this last 
construction being not only incongruent with Fichte’s authentic profile, but could also, 
strictly speaking, be deconstructed on its own terms.  
So, on the one hand Gentile - after Spaventa - tends to undervalue Fichte’s 
contribute (as well as Schelling's) as a mere point of transition between Kant and Hegel 
(the only two authors of that time with whom Gentile engages directly, assuming them 
perhaps to be the most credible references for Actual Idealism): with the obvious and 
logical consequence that, in the system of Actual Idealism, neither is there nor can there 
be any space for a critical and strict discussion of the Doctrine of Science, dismissively 
regarded as a transition system between Kant and Hegel, or as a mere epistemological 
Doctrine devoid of ontological interest. And yet, on the other hand, Gentile would have 
had to remove Fichte’s presence due to the excessive theoretical proximity between his 
                                                          
9R. Kroner, Von Kant bis Hegel, Mohr, Tübingen 1921-1924, 2 voll. 
10Roger Holmes unconvincingly resolves the issue inherent to the reasons why Gentile never expressed 
the name of Fichte, though he metabolized his thought: “Fichte was principally concerned about replacing 
the empirical deduction of categories executed by Kant with a systematic deduction of them as necessary 
act of the Ego. This problem, the second of the huge problems Fichte inherits from Kant, is according to 
Gentile a pseudo-problem” (R. Holmes, The Idealism of Giovanni Gentile, The Macmillan Company, 
New York 1937, p. 563).  
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own system and the Fichteian one: proximity by virtue of which Gentile would have to 
face his own theoretical dependence in reference to the Wissenschaftslehre and, 
moreover, accept the assumption of the latter as the foundation of Actual Idealism and 
of his own Fichteian reform of Hegel's dialectic. 
In Masullo's words, it would clearly emerge how, as Gentile "recognized his 
problem once and for all identical to that already questioned a century before by Fichte 
... i.e. that the assumption that "the absolute reality is the same activity of the mind in its 
expression", he couldn't have helped but lose interest in the erroneous solution being 
attempted by himself, and so abandon it to its own destiny, avoiding the distraction and 
the delay of a futile close comparison and an analytical examination. The Gentilian 
removal of Fichte should be, consequently, interpreted as a systematically and 
deliberately taken choice11, intended to - this is the main point - hide the thinker towards 
whom the Actualistic dialectic owes most in theoretical terms. 
Therefore, in the light of these considerations, it is necessary to explore more 
closely and in a more concrete way the connection between Gentile and Fichte, 
questioning Gentile's works as well as examining the core of the Actualistic dialectic 
where the assimilation of the Transzendentalphilosophie of the Wissenschaftslehre is 
most in evidence. 
 
3. Gentile as reader of Fichte 
 
The fact of the dependence of Gentile’s Actualist code on Fichte’s 
Wissenschaftslehre, the critical studies have always maintained, though from different 
points of view with different results. Besides the already mentioned Masullo, Roger 
Holmes, in his monographic study The Idealism of Giovanni Gentile (1937) –a true 
milestone in the studies on the Actualistic dialectic – openly addressed the nexus which 
unmistakably links the philosophy of Pure Act to the Doctrine of science:  
                                                          
11A. Masullo, Il pensiero di Fichte nella cultura italiana, cit., p. 160. “So, in the Italian speculative 
speech till the second world war, the destiny of Fichte’s presence has been consumed, sterilized and what 
has remained is the problematic charge, repressing every scientific and historical reconnaissance, in the 
lanes of the double and the opposing extreme refusal of those anti-idealistic who were getting rid of that 
thought for being an arrogant philosophy of the claimed infinity of the Ego, and of those idealistic who 
abruptly handled that as it were a missing Idealism, incapable of intending the infinity of the Ego” 
(ibidem).  
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“When Gentile defines his own system as Actual Idealism 
he should acknowledge as his direct forerunner the Actual 
Idealism of Fichte's Philosophy ”12. 
 
Another largely converging interpretation lies in History of Italian Philosophy 
by Eugenio Garin13. If, as it has emerged, the scholars have unanimously underlined 
Gentile’s missing acknowledgement of his very and crystal-clear dependence from the 
System der Freiheit, it is also necessary to point out that it establishes, so as to say, a 
real anomaly in the established practice of the philosopher of Actual Idealism. Indeed 
we know that Gentile has the habit of showing, with extreme academic rigour, the 
previous positions instead of his own, his own philosophy which, in a Hegelian way, 
questions the circularity between philosophy and its history and, in so doing, 
acknowledges the development of the thought in its own historical emergence.  
Being always careful to show the heritage and dependence nexus of philosophies 
in their essential historical development, and thus of Actual Idealism as a synthesis of 
the achievements of the German Idealism and of its reception by Spaventa, Gentile 
seems to omit Fichte’s exact name, which rarely appears in his reference records, based 
on the suggestion of Henry Silton Harris in his important essay Fichte and Gentile 
(1964), in these references the space made for Fichte is truly modest ”14, as much in the 
historical records as in the theoretical works. 
Also Harris, like Masullo, underlines Gentile’s dependence from Fichte: without 
the German philosopher it could not have been possible to “reform" Hegel, nor to 
realize the "Copernican revolution" started by Kant. To be more specific, as pointed out 
by Harris, "Gentile moves from the same position from which Fichte started15, not as to 
abandon Kant, but to develop his thought in a more coherent and, so to speak, "more 
Kantian" way, removing him from the dogmatic residual of Ding an sich. Gentile's own 
works, then, examine and critically discuss Kant with an essentially Fichteian aim, 
overcoming as well as actualizing the philosopher of Königsberg in an Idealist system 
(Wissenschaftslehre in Fichte, Actual Idealism in Gentile) assumed as the realized 
Copernican revolution. 
                                                          
12
 R. Holmes, The Idealism of Giovanni Gentile, cit., p. 4. 
13
 E. Garin, Storia della filosofia italiana, Einaudi, Torino 1966, II, p. 654. 
14
 H.S. Harris, Fichte e Gentile, cit., p. 557. 
15
 Ivi, p. 558. 
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Therefore, Fichte and Gentile "build on a radical critique of the Kantian 
philosophy"16 in order to develop it while leading it to its realization. Gentile, in a 
Fichteian way, completes Kant without clearly mentioning his own solution’is being 
based on Fichte: not only, as historian of philosophy, does he fail take into 
consideration, beyond the merest of hints, the perspective with which Fichte had 
realized Kant, but nor does he, from a theoretical point of view, force himself to make 
his dependence clear, or even, later on, his own discordance in reference to the 
Fichteian solution to Kant’s illogicality17. 
What is certain is that, from a rein theoretisch point of view, Gentile overcomes 
Kant in the same way Fichte did: concerning knowledge, the Ego discovers nothing but 
itself as a pure activity in act (the Tat-Handlung of the Wissenschaftslehre is 
metabolized by Gentile into the category of “autoctisi”), with the consequence - entirely 
Fichteian – by virtue of which the object of philosophy is not the being considered in 
itself, but the laws thanks to which the Ego discovers itself as an act-in-act, as unlimited 
autoctical activity. 
Hence philosophy cannot be a scientia scientiae, namely a Wissenschaftslehre18: 
the way to achieve it is through an original reflection with which the Ego limits itself 
(becoming an object and, in so doing, presenting itself as a Non-Ego), so as to gain 
awareness of itself through the dialectic process of the relation of mutual mediation 
between the Ego and the Non-Ego19. This operation puts into effect a rhythm thanks to 
which the Ego, in its development, denies itself continuously– simultaneously becoming 
Non-Ego – in order to be able to realize itself (act-in-act), in other words to overcome 
actively, by action, its own negation. In Fichte, as well as in Gentile, the Ego resolves 
itself into a practical energy, into a constant negation of its own negating. Being an 
activity, the Ego cannot rest statically, in an inactive form. It must indeed negate itself 
again and again, which means objectivizing itself, then again and again it must 
continuously overcome the negation imposed and removed. The Ego cannot be Ego if 
not by being Non-Ego. 
                                                          
16
 Ivi, p. 559. 
17
 “He [Gentile] acknowledges that Fichte has hugely stepped on in the Kantian criticism and in the 
development of the dialectic method; but he is not concerned about pointing out in what Fichte failed and 
what differences his concept of dialectic from that of the forerunner” (ibidem).  
18
 “He [Gentile] believes, as well as Fichte, that the origin of knowledge has to be found in the dialectic 
process of the thought” (ivi, p. 558).  
19
 Ivi, p. 561. 
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Not only does Gentile metabolize the overcoming-realization of Kantianism 
operated by Fichte, but uses the Doctrine of Science foundations so as to reform Hegel's 
dialectic: so far that the collection of essays dated 1913, The reform of the Hegelian 
Dialectic, might be conceived in some ways as a Fichteian reform of Hegelianism. As 
duly explained by Harris, Actual Idealism, to the extent that it “tries to acknowledge the 
content of the thought in the act itself of thinking, it is obliged to walk again the same 
path from Hegel to Fichte”20. 
As we know, the 1913 collection aspires to prove the Hegelian philosophy, 
liberating it from what remains of the "dialectic of the past" which is still present in a 
contradictory way.21 In fact, in Gentile's perspective, Hegel failed to coherently 
conceptualise “becoming”, since he remained, at least in part, nested in the metaphysic 
that – on this point converging with materialism - identifies its own object as distinct 
and pre-existing, in contrast with the thought which conceives it and, while conceiving 
it, posits it as pre-existing and with "the thought in the reality that itself realizes by 
conceiving it”22. 
Without exaggeration, we could argue that, strictly speaking, if Hegel himself is 
identified by Gentile as one of the historical figures of the "dialectic of thought" (along 
with Kant and Plato), only Fichte seems to have a legitimate claim to the branch of 
lineage to which Actual Idealism itself stakes a claim: Gentile, instead, does not 
mention Fichte at all, refusing to give him room and, in so doing, removing him and his 
presence tout court. 
As we know, in the path of Spaventa, Gentile refuses Hegel's perspective which 
puts, so to speak, the ideas in opposition to the thought which conceives them ("abstract 
concepts therefore unmoveable"), and conceives the thought and being identity in a still 
too static form, as if it had been already realized once for all. 23 This is misleading since, 
in this manner, the thought itself becomes objective compared with an activity that is 
the contemplation of the thought itself. This is the way we are led towards that 
"materialistic moment24 " already possessed by Platonism, which used to conceive the 
reality as ideal but, at the same level of the material reality, unmoveable and external 
                                                          
20
 Ivi, p. 558. 
21
 See G. Plastino, La dialettica hegeliana nella critica del Gentile, in “Theorein”, 1966, pp. 58-63. 
22
 G. Gentile, I fondamenti della filosofia del diritto, Le Lettere, Firenze 2003 (1916), p. 46. 
23
 See F. Pardo, La filosofia di Giovanni Gentile: genesi, sviluppo, unità sistematica, critica, Sansoni, 
Firenze 1972, pp. 137 ff. With regards to a critic of the Actualistic reform, see L. Basile, La mediazione 
mancata. Saggio su Giovanni Gentile, Marsilio, Padova 2008. 
24
 G. Gentile, Sommario di pedagogia come scienza filosofica, vol. I, Sommario di pedagogia generale, 
1913, Sansoni, Firenze 1982, p. 215. 
 UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DE PERNAMBUCO Ano 16 • n. 1 • jan/jun. 2016-1  
________________________________ ÁGORA FILOSÓFICA______________________________________________ 
 
 
12 
compared with the thinking thought. Exactly as materialism, also spiritualism, and 
Hegelianism as well, end up abstracting the spirit and in so doing falling again into the 
contradiction inherent to the "dialectic of the thought". 
With all due respect to Hegel and Plato, according to Gentile the thought, no less 
than consciousness of it, is never liable to be made objective because - as the Sicilian 
philosopher says – the thought is that which is being thought (act-in-act of thinking), in 
other words, as it posits itself with absolute liberty. Objectifying it has the same 
function as conceiving it as "been thought", i.e. as an object standing on its own, while 
forgetting the act that, by conceiving it, poses the thought as object in the act of the 
thought which conceives it during its action25.  
It is in this sense that Hegel has conceived the identity of being and thought in a 
still too rigid form (as - we could say - identity of being and thought and not of being 
and thinking in act). In so doing he has not questioned the fact that such an identity is 
guaranteed by the thinking as act-in-act, that is the concrete act of the thinking thought 
that, while conceiving it, puts the subject and the object in a relation of identity and 
opposition. For this reason Hegel's limit is presented by the assimilating the subject with 
the object, the thinking with the thought, Actual present with the past. The philosopher 
from Stuttgart, to put it simply, failed to conceive in a coherent way “becoming” as an 
endless act-in-act: seen this way by Hegel, “”becoming” is truthfully a “became”. Thus 
wrote Gentile in 1916, in General Theory of Spirit as pure act:  
“The transcendental point of view is that which you can 
perceive in the reality of our thought when this is 
considered not as an end-act, but as an act-in-act. An act 
which we cannot possibly transcend, since it is our own 
subjectivity, ourselves; an act which never and by no 
means can be objectified”26. 
The "dialectic of the thought" on which is based the true core of Actual Idealism 
reforms Hegel's dialectic27, as it considers in a Fichteian way the idea as act-in-act, or 
more precisely as an act of thought which put simultaneously the subject and the object 
into an unbreakable unity, by opposing them and resolving the opposition within the 
subject-object identity. In fact “the thought is - so it is in the Reform of Hegel's dialect - 
                                                          
25
 See G. Chiavacci, Il centro della speculazione gentiliana: l’attualità dell’atto, in “Giornale Critico 
della Filosofia Italiana”, 1947, pp. 74-94. See, inoltre, H.A. Cavallera, Immagine e costruzione del reale 
nel pensiero di Giovanni Gentile, Fondazione Ugo Spirito, Roma 1994. 
26
 G. Gentile, Teoria generale dello spirito come atto puro, Le Lettere, Firenze 1987 (1916), p. 8.  
27
 See M. Ciardo’s criticism, Un fallito tentativo di riforma dello hegelismo: l’Idealismo attuale, Laterza, 
Bari 1948. 
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an Act of thinking, where the thought has its foundation”28. But, perhaps, would it not 
be possible to find in this movement clear evidence of Gentile’s return to the 
Wissenschaftslehre as well as to the main concept of Tat-Handlung? Is, perhaps, the 
case that Actual Idealism keeps reforming the Hegelianism through Fichte? 
In part is Gentile himself who concedes it, but only in a marginal form. In a brief 
passage of the General Theory of Spirit as pure act, there is an decisive recognition of 
the importance of the Doctrine of Science in reference to the elaboration of the 
Actualistic Dialectic as overcoming-realizing of Kant’s transzendentalphilosophisch 
turn as well as a reform of Hegelianism: 
“An idealistic conception aims to conceive the same 
absolute, the overall, as idea: hence it is intrinsically 
absolute Idealism. But it cannot be absolute Idealism, if 
the idea does not coincide with the same act of knowing it. 
[...] A so strictly conceived Idealism plays the role 
assigned by Fichte to philosophy as epistemological 
doctrine. A role unaccomplished even by Hegel”29. 
Actual Idealism - as Gentile here suggests - performs the theoretical task 
assigned by Fichte to knowledge; such a task that Hegel himself had not been able to 
perform to its conclusion (falling, indeed, into the "dialectic of the thought") and now 
that the Sicilian philosopher believes to have resolved with the philosophy of pure act, 
which of course can be assumed as the achievement of the Fichteian 
Wissenschaftslehre, or as its realization in an even more coherent form compared to 
Fichte’s elaboration of it. Hence the latter – it could be also maintained, making clear 
what the General Theory of Spirit as Pure Act explained - is the one who first questions 
the theoretical necessity of a dialectic of the thought that does not allow itself to be 
reabsorbed within the dialectic of the thought. 
According to Gentile as well as to Fichte, the real is determined by the act-in-act 
of the thought that, while thinking it over, posits it into being. The object (the 
"Thought", The Non-Ego) never exists as a presupposition of the thought which 
conceives it and, in the act of so thinking it, posits itself in opposition. The being is 
thought, but in the sense that the being is given always and only in the act-in-act of the 
thinking thought, since it is Thought that - as in the Logic System as Theory of Knowing 
– “Has nothing known outside of itself, but its knowledge is the act itself of knowing”30. 
                                                          
28
 G. Gentile, La riforma della dialettica hegeliana, Le Lettere, Firenze 2003 (1913), p. 5.  
29
 Id., Teoria generale dello spirito come atto puro, cit., pp. 243-244. 
30
 Id., Sistema di logica come teoria del conoscere, 1917-1922, Le Lettere, Firenze 2003, 2 voll., I, p. 18. 
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Every thought presupposes an ongoing act of thought that, while thinking over 
it, puts it into being: "the only thought that is apparently real is the ongoing act of 
thinking, the determinate thought, our own thinking"31 such as that concretely realized 
in the act that puts it in a subject-object unity and in the thinking-thought duality, 
always realizing the unity of the act of thinking. The subject-objective identity is not 
given, but it is always put on action again and again in the act of the never-ending 
furnace of the thinking thought.32. 
It is in this sense that the dialectic of the thought "does not know any previously 
existing world"33, as it conceives the world as the result, always recreated, of the 
“cosmogonic” act of the thinking thought. Such a system of thought can be found quite 
literally in the Fichteian Bestimmung des Menschen dated 1800, in which it is expressly 
assumed that the act-in-act of the thinking thought is Weltschöpfer, “creator of world”34. 
There is a famous passage of the General Theory of Spirit as Pure Act which quite 
literally follows the words of Wissenschaftslehre: 
“Defy the ordinary and ignorant abstraction for which 
reality is what you conceive of it, whereas, if you conceive 
that, it can be no less than your own thought: point with a 
firm eye to this true and concrete reality that is the thought 
in act; and the dialectic of the real will appear so clear and 
certain as clear and certain it is to each of us having the 
consciousness of that which is thought: the seeing, for 
example, that which is seen”35. 
It was Fichte who recognises in the Ichform as condition of possibility for the 
conscience the fundamental practical principle, capable of justifying the conscience and 
the representation in form of "facts". 
In Fichte’s view, in the act of thinking there is coincidence between thinking and 
thought (the Ego corresponds to what is determined by putting itself in the same act by 
which an object is confronted). As sustained in the Sittenlehre of Jena dated 1798, “the 
concept of Ego is conceived when, in the act of thinking, the thinker (das Denkende) 
and the thought (das Gedachte) are supposed to be identical and, vice versa, what 
                                                          
31
 Id., Frammenti di estetica e teoria della storia, Le Lettere, Firenze 1992, p. 12. 
32
 Id., Sistema di logica come teoria del conoscere, cit., I, p. 150. 
33
 Id., La riforma della dialettica hegeliana, cit., p. 5. 
34
 J.G. Fichte, Gesamtausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (= GA), edited by R. Lauth 
and H. Jacob, Fromman-Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1962 ff., I, 6, p. 301. 
35G. Gentile, Teoria generale dello spirito come atto puro, cit., p. 57.  
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emerges in such an act of thinking is the concept of the Ego"36, intended as an endless 
activity, as it puts itself and the object in the identity of the putting and the self-putting, 
in the concrete act which is put by opposing some other to the Ego. 
In Gentile’s as well as Fichte’s opinion, the same theoretical activity ends up, 
therefore, falling again into the practical field, by the light of which it can be understood 
(in this sense, both agree that the practical justifies the reason in its unity). Gentile's 
example of the seeing is in itself completely Fichteian: conceiving the seeing means, 
likewise, "making it", that is properly seeing, in an active manner. In the in-actu seeing, 
both theory and praxis of the seeing coincide with the act in the act of the vision. 
According to the Wissenschaftslehre of 1804, "the seeing does not allow itself to be 
posited other than in the form of existing as immediately alive, energetic and active"37. 
With the words of the Wissenschaftslehre nova Methodo, "the Ego of the Doctrine of 
Science is not a mirror but an eye38: it does not reflect passively, but is the activity of 
the ongoing seeing, in accordance to a theme that will find its own proper expression in 
the Wissenschaftslehre of Königsberg dated 1807 (which indeed thematises the 
“Wissenschaftslehre as the art of seeing39).  
In the light of this brief crossing of some of the main theoretical plexuses of 
Actual dialectic, we can rightly maintain that also the Pure Act philosophy, as well as 
the Wissenschaftslehre, configures itself as a subjective Idealism: and this not only if we 
analyse Gentile’s philosophical nomenclature (which almost literally takes after the 
Fichteian one considering the metaphorical of the seeing, the dialectic between Ego and 
Non-Ego, between thinking thought and thought being thought), but also if we examine 
the foundation of his own philosophising, the assumption of the ongoing activity of the 
Ego as constitutive of the reality. 
As far as it concerns Fichte and Gentile’s philosophies - as suggested by Harris - 
"both are based on the dialectical activity of the subject - the Ego which, by putting 
itself into being, at the same time does likewise with the Non-Ego, the world – seen as 
the origin of all the reality”40. Both resolve subjectively the subject-object dialectic 
                                                          
36J.G. Fichte, System der Sittenlehre, 1798 (GA, I, 5, p. 37). See W. Metz, Der oberste Deduktionsgrund 
der Sittlichkeit. Fichtes Sittenlehre von 1798 in ihrem Verhältnis zur Wissenschaftslehre, in “Fichte-
Studien”, n. 11 (1997), pp. 147-159. 
37
 GA, II, 8, p. 398. 
38
 GA, IV, 3, p. 365. 
39
 GA, II, 10, p. 113. So it is written in the twelfth lesson: the seeing itself is seen, the seeing is seen” (see 
GA, II, 10, p. 146). “Whatever thing exists effectively, it only exists in the knowing and to the extent in 
which is known effectively” (GA, II, 10, p. 190).  
40
 H.S. Harris, Fichte e Gentile, cit., p. 557. 
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nexus by means of the act-in-act identified as the place of forming the subject-object 
unity, thinking and thought, Ego and Non-Ego41. 
Were the Gentilian Actual Idealism to be rightly understood as a form of 
subjective Idealism, then, as a recovery of Fichte’s Doctrine of Science in order to 
reform Hegel, it is Gentile himself who confirms it apertis verbis: 
[“Upon these concepts I have continued my work, steady 
on the original principle that, from the subject as being 
subject, would have to originate all reality ,and that 
therefore the subject would have to be conceived in the 
right way in reference to this absolute fiction ”]42. 
Also from this perspective it clearly arises how – according to what we just 
recalled by quoting the General Theory of the Spirit as Pure Act - Gentile unmistakably 
maintains that the Actualistic dialect plays the "role assigned by Fichte to philosophy as 
epistemology" conceiving the reality in the thought intended as an act of thinking. 
Actual dialectic goes beyond Kant and, concurrently, reforms Hegel on the foundation 
of the centrality of the ongoing activity of the Ego borrowed from the Doctrine of 
science. 
This perspective, developed by the subjective Actual Idealism, was already 
central in Fichte’s transcendental Idealism: not only in the Grundlage der gesamten 
Wissenschaftslehre (1794-1795), but also in the Wissenschaftslehre nova Methodo 
(1796-1799). Fichte demonstrates, more geometrico, how the objective world is 
determined by the activity of the subject's thought, in the knowledge that all we are able 
to conceive presupposes the act of thinking, the action of knowing: "the basis of every 
consciousness must grow through the action".43 
As in Gentile’s opinion, also Fichte maintains that knowledge is not to be 
understood as inert contemplation of being as a prerequisite of the thought, but on the 
contrary as creative and cosmogonic action that, bringing itself into being, similarly 
puts the objective world in the act of knowing44. Far from being the prerequisite of the 
thought, the Non-Ego has the thought as prerequisite. Proceeding in a transcendental 
way and genetically conceiving its own object in the form of Vorstellung des 
                                                          
41
 “This is the large debt Gentile owes Fichte. In fact, according to Gentile's Actual Idealism, the 
epistemological law of the spiritual reality is "that the object has to be resolved in the subject"  (ivi, p. 
562). 
42
 G. Gentile, Saggi critici, Riciardi, Napoli 1921, II, p. 12. 
43
 J.G. Fichte, Wissenschaftslehre 1798 nova methodo, 1798; GA, IV, 2, p. 40. 
44
 “ “If in our view something is made in a certain way, the reason is that we see it so through our 
making”: GA, IV, 2, p. 41. 
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Vorstellenden45, the Wissenschaftslehre relies on the transcendental principle by which 
the experience as fact resolves itself in the act which actively produces the fact of the 
experience. 
The practical act of our thought coincides with the subject that resolves in itself 
the object as a constructive process leaded by the same subject who, in order to 
objectivize the object in itself, must polarise in thinking and thought thanks to the 
concrete act of thinking which determines such a polarity. In the Bestimmung des 
Menschen, the theme of knowing as action is declined in a way that really seems to 
anticipate in toto the Gentilian solution also with regards to the terminology used. 
The thinking process - Fichte writes - is Act deines Geistes, act of your Soul46: 
the act which generates the consciousness of the object. Then, the last "is nothing but 
the consciousness of your putting an object into being"47: as a consequence, the Ego is 
subject as well as object, namely subject-object in the sense of a returning-in-itself 
knowledge, which posits itself by opposing an object and which has, as condition of 
consciousness, the appearance of the subject as well as of the object as distinct elements 
in the same unitary act of thinking. By intuition of the object, the Ego concurrently 
identifies itself as active, as conceiving and determining the Non-Ego. 
Gentile builds on the pursuit of the same subjectively-resolved subject-object 
unity on which Fichte laid the foundations of the Wissenschaftslehre as well as of the 
activity of the Ich as pure Tätigkeit. Now, in Gentile's perspective, Fichte failed to 
question the problem in clear terms, leaving to Actual Idealism the legacy of the 
solution for the ambiguities which till then belonged to the Doctrine of science48. 
Gentile writes: 
“Such a defect, such a contradiction within Kantianism is 
the issue raised by Fichte, who moves from the concept of 
Ego as the prior synthetic unity yet absolute making. The 
unity, as absolute making and thus presupposing nothing, 
is necessarily the imposition of itself: therefore self-
making. Kant did not conceive the making as self-making; 
so in his making there were no total possibilities of 
knowing, therefore the thing originated of itself, the limit 
of the activity of the Ego, or rather, the same Ego, who is 
nothing but activity. The knowing only in part was 
                                                          
45
 GA, I, 2, p. 361. 
46
 J.G. Fichte, Die Bestimmung des Menschen, 1800; tr. it. a cura di C. Cesa, La destinazione dell’uomo, 
Laterza, Roma-Bari 2001, p. 47. 
47
 Ivi, p. 51. 
48
 H.S. Harris, Fichte e Gentile, cit., p. 564.  
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making; but in part was made. The absolute making is 
self-making; the conscience is consciousness, the absolute 
production of the Ego. The which implies not only the 
position of the self (thesis) and the position relative to 
another of which one has consciousness (antithesis), but 
the identity of the Ego and the other (synthesis): it is 
indeed for this rhythm that the Ego posits itself while 
positing the opposition of itself, the Non-Ego; who is not 
its limit, since that is overcome by its very positing act of 
the Ego, and actually means its realization. Purely formal 
realization, of course. That is, the process by which Fichte 
resolves the Ego suggested by Kant is not the same as the 
real Ego that becomes aware of itself and at the same time 
conceives the real Non-Ego, of whom the Ego is aware. 
The Ego and the Non-Ego in which is realized the auto-
conscience are, in Fichte’s opinion, a mere form of 
knowing, but they are not the reality of knowing; they 
express the knowability of it, the internal mediation of the 
act by which it is known, but they neither give us the 
Being, nor the Ego. Fichte's achievement is that of the 
concept of the Ego as unity of Ego and Non-Ego; that is, 
he has the merit of having deepened the Kantian concept 
of category, and in general of the priority of the same Ego, 
by showing its genesis, and demonstrating that the Ego 
cannot conceive itself other than as itself together with the 
other: positive synthesis of the opposites”49. 
Here Gentile openly acknowledges Fichte's merit in having surpassed the 
contradictions of the Kantianism and the dogmatism which still characterises it. the 
ambiguity of Kantian knowing, based in part on "making" and "made"; are resolved by 
the Doctrine of science, which considers the Ego "nothing but the activity", the act-in-
act which, by putting itself, also puts its own contrary, bringing together the duality and 
the unity of the thinking in act (“the positive synthesis of the opposites", as Gentile 
says). 
"Fichte's achievement" is that of having conceived the Ego as a unity in the act 
of the Ego and Non-Ego, abandoning the Kantian Ding an sich and the contradictions 
brought about. And yet, in the way Fichte overcomes and realizes Kant, there is a limit 
which for Actual Idealism is necessary to overcome and correct: the process delineated 
by Fichte through the dialectic between Ego and Non-Ego remains on the ground of the 
"simple form of knowing", while never achieving the dimension of the "reality of 
                                                          
49
 G. Gentile, Le origine della filosofia contemporanea in Italia, Sansoni, Firenze 1935, p. 157. 
 UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DE PERNAMBUCO Ano 16 • n. 1 • jan/jun. 2016-1  
________________________________ ÁGORA FILOSÓFICA______________________________________________ 
 
 
19 
knowing". In other terms, the nexus of reciprocal mediation between Ego and Non-Ego 
at the core of the several Darstellungen of the Wissenschaftslehre expresses nothing but 
the "knowability" of the reality, "the internal mediation of the act" through which the 
real is being known.  
From this point of view Fichte would remain, in Gentile’s view, on the 
epistemological level while never reaching the ontological one; that is what happens 
instead with Actual dialectic. In the aforementioned passage, the latter is conceived by 
the author as a transposition, on the ontological level, of the dialectic which the 
Wissenschaftslehre had applied to the merely epistemological dimension. 
Such an interpretation also emerges from one of the rare passages where Gentile, 
in the pages of the Reform of the Hegel's Dialectic, briefly discusses Fichte's thesis 
while assuming it, in this case as well, as the one who set in a correct form the 
fundamental theoretical problem after Kant, yet without being able to resolve it in a 
satisfactory way, remaining always prisoner of an epistemological perspective, stricto 
sensu epistemological rather than ontological: 
“Fichte raised the new issue; but he failed to solve it, 
because he did not raise it with the proper rigour; and 
without practical faith his subjective Idealism remained a 
reality closed inside an unsurpassable limit”50. 
From this viewpoint, we can rightly affirm that Gentile himself conceives Actual 
dialectic as the realization of the Doctrine of science, as well as a coherent conclusion of 
the theoretical program started but not-fully accomplished by Fichte. Hence, in 
Gentile’s opinion Fichte, as has been pointed out, had assigned to philosophy the right 
task, by suggesting the direction so as to bring to completion the Kantian 
transzendentalphilosophisch change: but then he had not proved able to fulfil it to 
completion. That is why, after Fichte, it is still necessary to establish a unity in which 
the process is real and not only formal, ontological rather than epistemological.51. In this 
sense, with Holmes, we can assert that "if it is true that Fichte was the discoverer of the 
dialectic on which Gentile build his own logic, still he did not give it the same 
                                                          
50
 Id., La riforma della dialettica hegeliana, cit., p. 226. 
51So brilliantly has summarized Harris a possible solution: "Fichte’s Non-Ego is the non-Ego of the Ego, 
namely the ideal, or rather ideality of the real Non-Ego, because on the other hand Fichte saw that the Ego 
is the combination of Ego and Non-Ego; but he did not realize that the Non-Ego is equally the Non-Ego 
and the Ego together. In other words, his Non-Ego is not real, since he did not see that the real itself is 
ideal and cognizable" (H.S. Harris, Fichte e Gentile, cit., p. 566). 
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ontological meaning"52, remaining - as has been seen - prisoner in the epistemological 
dimension (and, in this, revealing his own and inerasable debt towards the Kantianism). 
Even in the Philosophy Introduction (1933), Gentile acknowledges, between the 
lines, Fichte’s absolute importance, as well as that of the Wissenschaftslehre: the same 
Actual Idealism corresponds to "that dialectic of the thought whose main problem was 
first questioned by Fichte"”53. Therefore Fichte, after Kant, was the first to point out 
which was the path to follow for the philosophy, by putting himself as the forerunner of 
Gentile's Actual Idealism, Fichte redivivus. Then Gentile adds that, after having 
clarified that the issue of the dialectic of the thought was formerly raised by the 
philosopher from Rammenau: “but Hegel firstly faced it with thorough awareness of the 
necessity of a new logic to oppose Aristotle's analytic one”54. 
On the other hand Hegel, as we know, faced it in such a way that he unwillingly 
fell again in the dialectic of the thought, suggesting to Gentile the theoretical need for a 
reform in reference to the Hegelian dialectic from a Fichteian perspective, in order to 
return to the prosperous issuing, by Fichte, of the subject-object identity subjectively 
resolved through the act-in-act of the thinking thought. In this sense, Actual Idealism 
would correct Hegel, reforming him through Fichte (he considers the former in the 
dialectic of the thought level, thanks to the act-in-act category); then, concurrently, he 
would reform Fichte through Hegel, by letting the former abandon the mere 
epistemological dimension in which he is still prisoner and take him in a more properly 
ontological field. 
In the light of these considerations, it becomes once more evident in which sense 
Gentile’s Actual Idealism is built on the groundwork of the problems and the paths 
suggested by the Fichteian Wissenschaftslehre, yet without any possible solution in 
itself. 
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